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ABSTRACT 
 
 This paper studies the incentives of a bidder to acquire information in an 
auction when her information acquisition decision is observed by the other 
bidders before they bid. Our results show that the sealed bid (second price) 
auction induces more information acquisition about a common component of 
the value than the open (English) auction, but less about the private component 
of the value. Moreover, under our assumptions more information about the 
private value and less information about the common value improves efficiency 
and revenue in some sense. Consequently, our results suggest new arguments 
in favor of the open auction. 
 
JEL classification: D41, D44, D82. 
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1 Introduction
Most auction theory models assume that bidders have some private information. How-
ever, relatively little is known about the origin of this private information and in
particular, the incentives of bidders to acquire it. This is not only an important the-
oretical question but also of practical concern in auction design. The reason is that
more or less information acquisition affects the efficiency and the auctioneer’s expected
revenue in the auction.
In this paper, we shall study a bidder’s incentives to acquire information about the
value that she may get from the object for sale. In particular, we shall focus on the case
in which a bidder’s information acquisition decision is observed by the other bidders,
i.e. open information acquisition. This model allows a richer theoretical problem than
the model in which the bidder’s information acquisition decision is not observed by
the other bidders, i.e. covert information acquisition. The reason is that in the open
model, information acquisition is a strategic variable in the sense that it may affect
the other bidders’ behavior, whereas this is not the case in the covert model.
Moreover, there are relevant real-life auctions in which the open information ac-
quisition model is the most appropriate. For instance, bidders that want to acquire
information in oil tract auctions use exploratory drills that are easily visible. There are
also other cases in which the auctioneer can control whether the bidders’ information
acquisition decision is observable. Consider again the example of oil tract auctions. It
is quite common that bidders that want to run exploratory drills must communicate
it to the auctioneer who could decide whether to reveal it.
Even if we are only interested in problems in which the information acquisition
decision is unobserved by the other bidders, it is always reasonable to wonder whether
bidders have incentives to make public their information acquisition decisions. To
answer that question, we need first to understand what happens when the information
acquisition decision is observed.
In our paper, we shall compare the incentives to acquire information in two standard
auction formats: a (second price) sealed bid auction, and an open (English) auction.
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Both formats are similar in the sense that, in both cases, the winner pays the highest
losing bid. However, they differ in one important aspect. The sealed bid auction is a
static game in which the only information revealed occurs when the auction is over,
whereas the open auction is a dynamic game in which there is a lot of information
revelation along the game, namely all the losing bids. Thus, the comparison between
these two auction formats is interesting not only by itself, but also because it isolates
the effect of the information revealed in a dynamic auction on the incentives to acquire
information. As a consequence, it sheds new light in the comparison between static
and dynamic auctions.
The information revealed along the open auction implies two differences with the
sealed bid auction. In the open auction bidders can, first, track the bid behavior of any
bidder, for instance, the one who acquires information, and, second, infer in equilibrium
the types of the bidders as they leave the auction. This is not the case in the sealed
bid auction. Our analysis shows that the first difference is the key to understand why
the incentives to acquire information openly in our two auction formats differ.1
Our results show that in a model in which the bidder’s uncertainty about her
value has private components and components common to all bidders, the incentives
to acquire more information about the common components in the sealed bid auction
are greater than in the open auction. However, the ranking is the opposite, at least
if there are sufficiently many bidders, when the information acquisition is about the
private component of the bidder’s value.
Our results also show that once the open information acquisition decision of bidders
is endogenized, in the symmetric equilibrium of the game there is more information
1The second difference may play a role in explaining the differences in bidders’ incentives to ac-
quire information but not under our assumptions. Intuitively, a bidder has less incentives to acquire
information about her value if she expects to learn the other bidders’ private information along the
auction, at least if there is some kind of substitutability among the bidders’ private signals. However,
we rule out this effect with an assumption, independency of the bidders’ private information. Our
reason, as we explain in Section 2, is that the effect we comment in this footnote exists with open
or covert information acquisition, and our aim is the study of the effects that are exclusive of open
information acquisition.
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acquisition in the open auction about the private value and less about the common
value than in the sealed bid auction. Moreover, we derive from these results new
arguments that suggest that the open auction may give greater expected revenue and
be more efficient than the sealed bid auction.
The issue of bidders’ open information acquisition in auctions has received very
little attention. There are some partial results as a side-product in the work of
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom, and Weber (1983), and Hernando-Veciana (2004).
Larson (2004) and Hernando-Veciana and Tro¨ge (2005) provide an analysis of the
value of private information in auctions when information acquisition is observable.
These two papers, however, only study the open auction and information acquisition
about the common value, whereas we also study the sealed bid auction and the value
of additional information about the private value.
One possible explanation for this lack of attention are the technical difficulties
inherent to the analysis of what has been called asymmetric auctions. These are
auctions in which bidders differ from an ex ante point of view, or in other words,
where the identity of bidders matters. Most of the work in auction theory requires
the study of sophisticated mathematical models that can only be solved explicitly
appealing to anonymity assumptions. In fact, it is complex to provide conditions that
assure existence, see for instance Athey (2000), or uniqueness of the equilibrium, see
Parreiras (2004) and Larson (2004), once asymmetries among bidders are allowed.
But, when bidders’ information acquisition decisions are observed before the begin-
ning of the auction game, we must necessarily consider asymmetric auctions. Even if
we study a symmetric equilibrium in which bidders acquire the same level of informa-
tion in equilibrium, we must solve the auction game for deviations of this symmetric
equilibrium. In these deviations, a bidder takes a different information acquisition
decision than the other bidders. Since the other bidders observe the choice of the
bidder who deviates before the auction stage, we can no longer analyze the auction as
a symmetric game. In fact, a side-product of our analysis is to provide an equilibrium
analysis of these asymmetric auctions.
Thus, our paper is related from a technical point of view to a growing literature on
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asymmetric auctions in which one bidder is better informed than the others. Models
particulary closed are those by Hernando-Veciana (2004), Larson (2004) and Hernando-
Veciana and Tro¨ge (2005) that have been already referred, and to an independent and
simultaneous paper by Boone and Goeree (2005). This last paper differs in that it
concentrates on the optimal auction design and does not consider the question of
information acquisition.
There exist some other papers that have studied the problem of covert information
acquisition. For instance, two early examples are Matthews (1984) and Lee (1985),
and more recently, Persico (2000), Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2002), Hagedorn (2004)
and Hernando-Veciana (2005). The difference with our approach is that in this case
information acquisition is not a strategic variable in the sense that it cannot affect the
bid behavior of the other bidders since it is not observable. The contribution of our
paper is to address this strategic effect.
Compte and Jehiel (2002) also compare information acquisition in the sealed bid
auction and the open auction. However, their paper differs from ours in that they
study a pure private value model. Under this assumption it is irrelevant whether the
information acquisition choices are observed since they do not affect the other bidders’
bid behavior, at least in the auction formats that Compte and Jehiel (2002) study.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the as-
sumptions of the model: basically we study a two-stage game, in a first stage bidders
decide how much information to acquire and in the second stage they participate in an
auction game. We study the second stage in Section 3, and the first stage in Section 4.
In Section 5, we study the implications of our results for the efficiency of the auction
and the auctioneer’s expected revenue. Finally, Section 6 concludes. We also include
an Appendix with the most technical proofs.
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2 The Model
We study a model in which one unit of an indivisible object is put up for sale to
a set I ≡ {1, 2, ..., n}, where2 n ≥ 3, of risk neutral bidders whose values on the
object for sale have private and common components. In particular, we assume that
a generic bidder i ∈ I puts a monetary value of Ti +
∑
j∈I Qj in the consumption
of the good. Note that Ti (for taste) is a private value component as it only affects
i’s preferences whereas Qi (for quality) is a common value component that affects all
bidders’ preferences.
Note that we are assuming additive separability of the utility function. This as-
sumption simplifies our problem as it allows us a straightforward application of the
techniques developed by Myerson (1981). Moreover, it also simplifies the compari-
son of the allocation implemented in each of the auction games we study. We could
get similar results assuming additive separability only of the private and the common
value,3 i.e. between Ti and (Q1, ..., Qn). We also conjecture that a marginal version of
our results must also hold true when we relax this assumption. The reason is that any
smooth function can be approximately linearized locally.
We shall assume that Bidder i ∈ I observes privately a noisy signal informative
of the common value component Qi and the bidder’s private value Ti. This signal is
one element of a family {Xηii }ηi∈N in which the index ηi will be referred as Bidder
i’s information precision. We also introduce some ex ante symmetry assumptions
and assume independency between the bidders’ private information. In particular, we
assume that the random vectors (Ti, Qi, (X
ηi
i )ηi∈N ) are independent and identically
distributed across bidders.
From a technical point of view, our assumption of independency of the bidders’
2We assume that n ≥ 3 since our open and sealed bid auctions are strategically equivalent for
n = 2.
3We assume additive separability among the common value components to guarantee that the
bidders’ expected utility is linear not only on the bidder’s private component Ti but also on the bidder’s
common value component Qi. We are interested in keeping this symmetry between the private and
the common component to be able to derive the same notion of a more informative signal, see below,
for the private and the common value component.
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private information simplifies our problem since we can apply Myerson’s (1981) tech-
niques. However, there is a more important reason for this assumption. The bidder’s
information acquisition has two types of effects: strategic and non-strategic; the former
one because a bidder’s information acquisition, if observable, may affect the bids of
the other bidders, and the latter one because a more informed bidder can take better
decisions. Clearly, the non-strategic effects appear independently of whether the infor-
mation acquisition is open or covert, whereas the strategic effects are exclusive of the
open case.
The non-strategic effects and their differences across auction formats have already
been studied in models of covert information acquisition. For instance, Hernando-
Veciana (2005) shows that an adaptation of the arguments given by Persico (2000)
implies a sealed bid auction gives larger incentives to acquire information covertly
than the open auction when signals are affiliated. The contribution of our paper is
the study of the strategic effects, and thus we would want to abstract from the non-
strategic effects. This is what the assumption of independency of the bidders’ private
information does for us.
We shall impose some structure on our family of bidders’ signals for two reasons.
First, we want to associate higher realizations of the signals to higher willingness to
pay, and second, we want higher values of ηi to denote more informative signals. We
shall derive our assumptions from the results by Athey and Levin (2001).
Under our assumptions of additive separability and independency of the bidders’
types, the utility of Bidder i in any auction game, and for some fixed strategies of the
other bidders, is linear in both Ti and Qi. Moreover, Bidder j’s utility is also linear
in Qi for the other bidders’ strategies fixed. An application of Lemma 1 in Athey and
Levin (2001) shows that a sufficient condition to assure that a higher signal induces
higher bidding for bidders with value functions that are linear in either Ti or Qi or
both is that E[Ti|Xηii = x] and E[Qi|Xηii = x] are both increasing. In this sense we
can say that high realizations of Xηii correspond to good news and low realizations to
bad news.
To simplify notation in what follows, we normalize the marginal distribution of each
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private signal Xηii to be uniform in the interval [0, 1]. To see why this normalization
is without loss of generality, suppose that our original signal Xηii had a distribution
function G that was not uniform. We could define a new signal Xˆηii ≡ G(Xηii ) which
has a uniform distribution function on [0, 1]. Moreover, Xˆηii is equally informative
since it is a monotone transformation4 of Xηii .
We use a concept of more informative signals that identifies a more informative
signal with a more valuable5 signal in the tradition of Blackwell (1951). However,
instead of requiring that a more informative signal must be more valuable for any
decision problem, as it was Blackwell’s original approach, we restrict to the type of
decision problems that bidders face in our model. As we have already argued, these are
problems linear in the state. Note that another difference with Blackwell’s approach
is that we take as given the prior on the state.
Denote by F ηVi(.|X
η
i ) the posterior of Vi, Vi ∈ {Ti, Qi}, conditional on signal Xηi ,
and SVi the support of Vi. Then:
Definition: We say that signal Xηi is more informative of Vi, for Vi ∈ {Ti, Qi}, than
signal Xη
′
i if and only if,
E
[
max
a
∫
u(vi, a) dF
η
Vi
(vi|Xηi )
]
≥ E
[
max
a
∫
u(vi, a) dF
η′
Vi
(vi|Xη
′
i )
]
,
for any function u : SVi × A → R+ linear in the first argument, continuous in the
second one, and A compact.
However, we shall use in our analysis the following result that gives a more tractable
characterization of more informative signals.
Lemma 1. Signal Xηi is more informative of Vi, for Vi ∈ t{Ti, Qi}, than signal Xη
′
i if
and only if, E[Vi|Xηi ≤ x] ≤ E[Vi|Xη
′
i ≤ x] for any x ∈ [0, 1].
4The argument we have given only works for G continuous and strictly increasing in the support.
See Athey and Levin (2001) and Lehmann (1988) for the general case.
5We could use instead an ad hoc concept of more informative signals. However, note that a definition
with no economic content would always have two drawbacks. First, we can discuss why one definition
and not another one. And second, we can always suspect that our results are a consequence of some
of the artificial restrictions imposed by our definition.
9
Proof. The proof is a direct application of Theorem 1 of Athey and Levin (2001). ¥
Note that the former characterization also has an intuitive meaning. Recall that
low realizations of the signal mean bad news in the sense of a lower conditional expected
value. Thus, what this characterization says is that a more informative signal makes
bad news to become worse news. It is also straightforward to show that the above
characterization is equivalent to a characterization in which all the inequalities are
reversed. Intuitively, what this means is that our characterization also implies that a
more informative signal makes good news better news.
We show in Appendix D that according to our definition, a signal Xηi is more
informative of Vi, Vi ∈ {Ti, Qi} than another signal Xη
′
i if and only if the distribution
of the conditional expected value E[Vi|Xηi ] is dominated in the sense of second order
stochastic dominance by the distribution of the conditional expected value E[Vi|Xη
′
i ].
In this sense, we can say that acquiring more information increases the spread of the
distribution of the conditional expected value.
We also introduce some regularity assumptions. We assume that the conditional
expected values E[Ti|Xηi = x] and E[Qi|Xηi = x] have continuous derivatives in x. We
also assume that the function µ(x, η) ≡ E[Qi|Xηi = x]−E[Qi|Xηi ≤ x] is increasing in
x, for any6 η. Finally, we assume that there exists a bound ν > 0 such that,
1
ν
<
∂E[Ti|Xηi = x]
∂x
,
∂E[Qi|Xηi = x]
∂x
< ν, for any x ∈ [0, 1]
Next example illustrates our assumptions:
Example A: Suppose that Qi and Ti, ∀i ∈ I, follow an independent uni-
form distribution with support [0, 1], and Xηi is a lottery that is equal to Qi
with probability ηT (η), it is equal to Ti with probability ηQ(η), and with
6A sufficient condition for this regularity assumption is that the cumulative distribution function of
the conditional expected value E[Qi|Xηi ], is log-concave, an assumption satisfied by many distribution
functions, see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (1989), for instance any distribution function of the form F (q) =
qr, r ≥ 1, and any truncated exponential, normal, logistic, extreme-value, chi-square, chi, and Laplace
distributions. This is also equivalent to the assumption that the inverse of the function g(x) =
E[Qi|Xηi = x] is log-concave.
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the remaining probability, it is equal to an independent random variable
with uniform distribution, where ηT and ηQ are weakly increasing func-
tions with domain in ( 1ν , ν). To see that higher values of η means more
informative signals, note that,
E[Ti|Xη = x] = ηT (η)x+ (1− ηT (η))12 ,
and,
E[Ti|Xη ≤ x] = ηT (η)x2 + (1− ηT (η))
1
2
.
The functions that correspond to Qi are identical but using ηQ instead of
ηT .
We shall focus on two extreme models of information acquisition. In the first one,
the common value information acquisition model, we assume that a higher information
precision η corresponds to a more informative signal of the common value component,
but it does not change the conditional expected private value E[Ti|Xηi = x] for any
x ∈ [0, 1]. In the other model, the private value information acquisition model, we
make the symmetric assumption, a higher η corresponds to a more informative signal
with respect to the private value component, but it does not change E[Qi|Xηi = x] for
any x ∈ [0, 1].
It is important to remark that in both models, the bidders’ values have private
and common value components and bidders have private information about both. The
difference is the meaning of additional information. In the first model, to acquire more
information means that the signal becomes more informative of the common value
component but it remains equally informative about the private value component.
The opposite happens in the second model.
Our two models of information acquisition can make sense in some real-life auctions.
However, the main point is to offer two theoretical benchmarks that allow clear-cut
comparative statics. As we shall see, the crucial assumption is that in one model a
bidder’s information acquisition changes how informative is her bid (assuming now and
in what follows strictly increasing bid functions)7 either with respect to the common or
7We focus on the informativeness of the action rather than in the informativeness of the signal for
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the private value components, but not with respect to both components simultaneously.
Other models have not made this distinction. In fact, our model seems to lie somewhere
in between two opposite models.
On the one hand, models as Hernando-Veciana and Tro¨ge (2005) in which bidder’s
information acquisition makes the bidder’s bid more informative with respect to the
common value but at the same time less informative with respect to the private value.
This is a natural consequence of two-dimensional bidders’ private information, where
one dimension is informative of the common value and the other one of the private
value.8 The implicit assumption is that the good has several unrelated characteristics,
some of them affect all the bidders’ values in exactly the same fashion, and some others
only affect to the value of one single bidder.
On the other hand, other models, for instance Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2002),
have assumed the opposite. This is, an increase in the informativeness of the bidder’s
signal implies an increase in the informativeness of her bid with respect to both the
common and the private value. The implicit assumption is that the bidder learns about
some characteristics of the good for sale which are valuable to all bidders but more to
her than to the other bidders.
We introduce an additional assumption in the common value information acquisi-
tion model. We assume that the function µ(x, η) is increasing in η. The reason for
this assumption is that it makes our results stronger at a small cost, see after Lemma
3. Note that the definition of more informative signals only implies that µ(x, η) is
two reasons: the first one is to allow a homogeneous comparison of models with one or two dimensional
signals, the second is that the strategic effects of information acquisition depend on how informative
the bidder’s actions are rather than in how informative the bidder’s signals are.
8For example, consider a two-dimensional signal in which one dimension is perfectly informative of
the private value component and the other dimension is completely uninformative, and another signal
in which the first dimension is perfectly informative of the private value and the second dimension
is perfectly informative of the common value. Certainly, the bids induced by the second signal are
more informative of the common value than the first one, but it is easy to see that they are also
less informative of the private value. Note, however, that there are examples in which the opposite
happens: an increase in the informativeness of the private value dimension of a two-dimensional signal
makes the induced bids more informative not only of the private value but also of the common value.
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increasing in η for x equal to 0 or to 1. To understand the intuitive meaning of this
additional restriction note that µ(x, η) = E[Qi|Xηi ≥ x,Xηi ≤ x] − E[Qi|Xηi ≤ x].
Thus, we can interpret this last assumption as that a more informative signal makes
good news in the sense of {Xηi ≥ x} become better news when we also condition on
{Xηi ≤ x}.
We also introduce an additional assumption in the private value information ac-
quisition model, we assume that E[Ti|Xηi = 1] is strictly increasing. Note that our
definition of more informative signals only implies that it is weakly increasing. This
assumption is not essential for our analysis but makes the proof of the second item of
Proposition 3 simpler.
To model open information acquisition decision we have in mind a two-stage model.
In the first stage bidders choose independently and simultaneously the precision of their
information at some cost. These decisions are made public at the end of the first stage.
In a second stage, bidders bid in an auction game. We shall assume a quite standard
structure for the auction stage: each bidder first observes privately the realization of
the signal she chose in the first stage and then they all participate in an auction which
we assume to be either an open (ascending) auction9 (O) or a sealed bid (second price)
auction10 (S) with neither a reserve price nor an entry fee.
The simultaneity of the bidders’ information acquisition decision may seem in con-
9We assume that the auction procedure is as follows, at every moment of time there are two types of
bidders: active bidders and inactive bidders. Bidders are active until they manifest that they want to
become inactive. Once a bidder has decided to become inactive her decision is irreversible. The identity
of the active bidders is publicly observable along the auction. The price is also publicly observable and
increases continuously from zero. At each moment in time bidders can decide to become inactive. The
price stops increasing whenever there is no more than one active bidder. In this case, the remaining
active bidder gets the unit for sale. If there is no active bidder when the price stops, the good is
randomly allocated (with equal probability) among the bidders that quit at the last price. The price
paid by all the winners is the price at which the auction stopped.
10In this auction set-up, all bidders submit simultaneously one bid each. The bidder who has
submitted the highest bid gets the good at the price of the second highest bid. If two bidders submit
the highest bid, the price equals this bid and the good is allocated randomly among all the bidders
that submitted the highest bid, whereby all such bidders have the same probability of being selected.
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flict with the assumption that the information acquisition decisions are observable
before the auction game. One justification is that bidders information acquisition de-
cision must be taken before the visible part of the process of information acquisition
starts. For instance, an oil company may need permissions, hire the equipment and
contract consulting services before starting a drill. A more basic reason for this as-
sumption is that we want to focus on the incentives to acquire information abstracting
from other strategic issues in the information acquisition game like first mover ad-
vantages, predatory strategies and endogenous timing. They seem relevant issues but
more appropriate for extensions.
In the next sections, we analyze our model. We start with the auction games and
finish with the information acquisition stage.
3 Analysis of the Auction Games
In this section we study the second stage of our game, the auction game. We start
by providing an intuitive understanding of the bidders’ incentives to change the bid
which we use to analyze the strategic effects induced by open information acquisition.
Later, we solve for the equilibrium of the auction games and show that the insights
that we have learnt explain our equilibrium results.
In both auction formats, the sealed bid auction and the open auction, a bidder’s
bid only determines whether the bidder wins or loses the auction, but not the price
that she pays when she wins, which is equal to the highest bid of the other bidders.
In particular, the bidder wins if her bid is greater than the highest bid of the other
bidders and loses otherwise.
As a consequence, an increase in the bid only affects the bidder because she can
pass from losing to winning when the highest bid of the other bidders is between her
old bid and her new bid. Certainly, if the increase in the bid is marginal, the only
change happens when the bidder was tying with the highest bid of the other bidders.
Thus, a bidder that bids p has incentives to increase (or similarly, decrease) her bid a
marginal amount if her expected value of the good conditional on the event that the
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highest bid of the other bidders is equal to p is greater (respectively, less) than her bid
p.
The event that the highest bid of the other bidders is equal to p is the intersection
of two other events: the event that the highest bid of the other bidders is greater than
p, and the event that the highest bid of the other bidders is less than p. The first
event is good news about the common value, and hence it induces greater incentives to
increase the bid. This event has been called the loser’s curse as a bidder who ignores
it will bid too low and may regret losing. The second event is bad news about the
common value, and hence it induces lower incentives to increase the bid. This event
has been called the winner’s curse as a bidder who ignores it will bid too high and
may regret winning.11
For the sake of simplicity, we shall only consider auction games in which one single
bidder acquires different information than the other bidders. This analysis is sufficient
to study equilibria of the first stage in which all bidders acquire the same level of
information because we only need to consider deviations of one single bidder. We thus
call this bidder the deviating bidder and denote her index by d ∈ I and her information
precision by ηd. We refer to the other bidders as non-deviating bidders and to their
information precision by η.
The strategic effect associated to the information acquisition decision of the devi-
ating bidder comes from the change in the bid behavior of the non-deviating bidders.
We, thus, focus on the incentives to change the bid of the non-deviating bidders, first,
in the open auction and, second, in the sealed bid auction.
The open auction is a dynamic game with several information sets. However, a
non-deviating bidder generally ties with the highest bid of the other bidders only in
information sets in which the bidder that makes that bid is the only other bidder who
remains in the auction. Moreover, since we are interested in the incentives to change
the bid of a non-deviating bidder only because its effect on the expected utility of the
deviating bidder we focus on the case in which the deviating bidder is the only other
11The description of the winner’s curse and loser’s curse in terms of statistical events was first used
by Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997). They also introduced the notion of loser’s curse in auctions.
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remaining bidder.
In the information sets we mention above, the highest bid of the other bidders
is certainly the deviating bidder’s bid and thus the loser’s curse means that her bid
is greater than p. Moreover, the types of all the bidders who have already left the
auction can be inferred in equilibrium from the price at which they have quit, and
hence they are public information. Consequently, the winner’s curse only means that
the bid of the deviating bidder is less than p. We can illustrate these two effects with
a formalization of the incentives of a non-deviating bidder, say Bidder i, with type xi
to change marginally her bid around p:
E
Ti + n∑
j=1
Qj
∣∣∣∣∣∣Xηi = xi, bOd (Xηdd ) ≥ p︸ ︷︷ ︸
loser’s curse
, bOd (X
ηd
d ) ≤ p︸ ︷︷ ︸
winner’s curse
,X
− p, (1)
where X is the information about the other bidders inferred along the equilibrium path
and bOd denotes the bid function used by the deviating bidder in the above information
sets.
The incentives of a non-deviating bidder in a sealed bid auction are similar to the
open auction but with two differences. The first one is that a given non-deviating
bidder has uncertainty about the identity of the bidder that submits the highest bid
of the other bidders: it may be the deviating bidder or another non-deviating bidder.
This difference affects the loser’s curse which in this auction set-up means that with
some probability, say12 ρ, the bid of the deviating bidder is greater than p and with
the complementary probability it is the the bid of another non-deviating bidder.
The second difference is that there is no information revelation along the auction,
and thus, the bidder does not have any additional information about the other bidders’
types. This difference makes the winner’s curse stronger in the sense that it gives bad
news about the types of more other bidders.
12This probability must be computed conditional on the event that it is relevant for the bidder,
this is that the highest bid of the other bidders is equal to p. Moreover, we shall see later that this
probability depends on p and on the shape of the bidders’ bid functions. We have abstracted from
these complications in the current description to make our arguments clearer. Although we take them
into account later in the equilibrium analysis.
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We shall see that the difference in the loser’s curse between our two auction for-
mats explains our ranking of auctions in terms of incentives to acquire information.
However, and because of our assumptions of additive separability and independency of
the bidders’ types, the difference in the winner’s curse does not have any implication
on the comparison of our auction formats.
Again, to illustrate the loser’s curse and the winner’s curse, we formalize the in-
centives of a non-deviating bidder with type xi to change her bid marginally around a
price p:
(1− ρ)E
Ti + n∑
j=1
Qj
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Xηi = xi, bSnd(Xηj ) ≥ p︸ ︷︷ ︸
loser’s curse
, bSd (X
ηd
d ) ≤ p, {bSnd(Xηl ) ≤ p}l 6=d,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
winner’s curse
+
ρE
Ti + n∑
j=1
Qj
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Xηi = xi, bSd (Xηdd ) ≥ p︸ ︷︷ ︸loser’s curse , b
S
d (X
ηd
d ) ≤ p, {bSnd(Xηl ) ≤ p}l 6=d,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
winner’s curse
− p, (2)
where bSd denotes the bid function of the deviating bidder and b
S
nd the bid function
used by all the other non-deviating bidders.
Consider first the common value information model. If the deviating bidder ac-
quires a more informative signal, it increases both the loser’s and the winner’s curse
of the non-deviating bidders, and hence affects the non-deviating bidders’ incentives
to change their bids. The final effect on the incentives to increase the bid is unclear.
It may be positive if the effect on the loser’s curse dominates and negative if it is the
effect on the winner’s curse which dominates.13
Nevertheless, while the increase of the winner’s curse affects both auction formats
with the same magnitude, the increase of the loser’s curse is stronger in the open auc-
tion than in the sealed bid auction. The reason, as we explain above, is that the private
information of the deviating bidder affects the loser’s curse only with probability ρ.
As a consequence, we expect the bids of the non-deviating bidders to increase less (or
13It may be shown that the effect is positive, i.e. induces higher bidding, for high prices and negative,
i.e. induces lower bidding, for low prices, at least in the open auction. We do not explore this argument
here because it is not essential for our results. Hernando-Veciana and Tro¨ge (2005) have provided a
more detailed analysis.
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decrease more) in the sealed bid auction than in the open auction. In principle, this
effect should give greater incentives to acquire information in the sealed bid auction
than in the open auction. This is shown in Proposition 3.
Consider next the private value information model. In this case, there is no di-
rect effect because the private information of the deviating bidder only affects the
incentives of the non-deviating bidders through the common value, and by assumption
the informativeness of the signal of the deviating bidder with respect to the common
value is kept constant. However, a more informative signal induces a spread (in the
sense of second order stochastic dominance, see Appendix D) of the deviating bidder’s
conditional expected private value E[Td|Xηdd ] and, consequently, of her bids. It ap-
proximately means that high bids become higher and low bids become lower. We shall
argue that this effect has the opposite consequences on the non-deviating bidders’ bids,
this is, it makes them less spread.
The fact that the deviating bidder makes higher her high bids affects the non-
deviating bidders’ incentives to submit high bids. The reason is that higher bids by
the deviating bidder means that the bad news of the winner’s curse becomes worse and
the good news of the loser’s curse not so good. Figure 1 illustrates these two effects.
We can see that for a fixed price p sufficiently high, the steeper the bid function is,
the lower the signals that the loser’s curse indicates, and hence the less good the good
news of the loser’s curse are. Similarly, for a fixed price p sufficiently high, the steeper
the bid function is, the lower the signals the winner’s curse indicates, and hence, the
worse the bad news of the winner’s curse are.
The combination of both effects reduces the incentives of the non-deviating bidders
to increase the bid and hence we would expect that in equilibrium the non-deviating
bidders lower their high bids.14 Symmetric reasons explain that low bids of the devi-
ating bidder lower induces the non-deviating bidders to make their low bids higher.
The reduction of the spread of the bids of the non-deviating bidders does not have
14This change in the bid of the non-deviating bidders may induce a similar effect but of opposite
direction in the deviating bidder’s bids. Moreover, this new change of the deviating bidder’s bids
should reinforce the change in the non-deviating bids creating a feedback loop. This effect was already
pointed out by Bulow, Huang, and Klemperer (1999) for the open auction.
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Figure 1: Change in the winner’s curse (WC0 →WC1) and loser’s curse (LC0 → LC1)
for a high bid p as a consequence of a change in the bid function (Bid0 → Bid1).
obvious consequences on the expected utility of the deviating bidder but in one case,
when the number of bidders is sufficiently large. In this case, the highest bid of the
non-deviating bidders is with high probability a high bid, and hence, the reduction
of the high bids of non-deviating bidders is more important than the increase of their
low bids. Consequently, this strategic effect should give greater incentives to acquire
information. More importantly, this effect should be stronger, and thus the incentives
to acquire information, in the open auction than in the sealed bid auction because
of the difference in the loser’s curse we pointed out above. This result is proved in
Proposition 3.
We now move to the equilibrium analysis of our two auction games. This analy-
sis will show that the effects studied in this section translate into some equilibrium
results that support the ranking of auctions with respect to the incentives to acquire
information that we have suggested.
Our equilibrium analysis will be based on the study of the allocation implemented in
the equilibrium of each of the auction formats. In the case of an equilibrium in which all
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the non-deviating bidders use the same strictly increasing bid strategy (and the good is
always sold), an allocation can be characterized by a function, the allocation function,
that maps types of the deviating bidder into types of the non-deviating bidders. The
good goes to the non-deviating bidder with highest type if its image is higher than the
deviating bidder’s type, and otherwise, it goes to the deviating bidder.
There are two reasons to focus on allocation functions. First, it may be shown that
in our model, the comparison between the bids across auction formats is equivalent,
in some sense, to the comparison of the allocations functions. Second, and more
important, the incentives of the deviating bidder to acquire information depend on
how her expected utility varies with changes in the her information precision, and, as
we shall see in Lemma 5, the expected utility of a deviating bidder is characterized by
the allocation function.
An allocation function maps types of the deviating bidder into types of the non-
deviating bidders, if any, that make the same bid. We, thus, deduce the allocation
functions that correspond to each auction format from some equilibrium conditions
that relate these types. In particular, we use the condition that a bidder does not have
incentives neither to increase not to decrease her bid marginally in equilibrium.
3.1 Allocation Function of the Open Auction
Denote by xi and xd the types of a non-deviating bidder, say Bidder i, and the deviating
bidder, respectively, that bid in a given equilibrium the same price p in the information
sets in which they are the only bidders who remain in the auction. Denote also by X
the information that these two bidders can infer along the equilibrium path about the
types of the other bidders. For the reasons explained at the beginning of the section,
our equilibrium condition for the non-deviating bidder is:
E
Ti + n∑
j=1
Qj
∣∣∣∣∣∣Xηi = xi, Xηdd = xd,X
− p = 0, (3)
20
and similar arguments let us deduce that our equilibrium condition for the deviating
bidder is:
E
Td + n∑
j=1
Qj
∣∣∣∣∣∣Xηd = xd, Xηi = xi,X
− p = 0. (4)
Subtracting both equations, and after some simplifications, we get the following
equation that relates xd and xi:
E[Td|Xηdd = xd]− E[Ti|Xηi = xi] = 0. (5)
Under our assumptions, the left hand side of Equation (5) is continuous in xi and
xd, strictly increasing in xd and strictly decreasing in xi. Hence, it defines implicitly a
strictly increasing function φO that maps types of the deviating bidder xd into types
of the non-deviating bidder xi that solve the above equation and whose graph splits
the set [0, 1]2 into two subsets.
The function φO defined above characterizes an allocation, however, it is convenient
to make sure that the allocation function is defined in the domain [0, 1]. We call the
extension of φO in the domain [0, 1] to a function that we denote by φˆO(xd) and which
is equal to 0 if xd is to the left of the domain of φO, to φO(xd) if xd is in the domain
of φO, and to one, if xd is to the right of the domain of φO. Similarly, we denote by
φ−1O the inverse of φO and by φˆ
−1 the extension of φ−1O to [0, 1]. Figure 2 illustrates
the extension of a function φ in [0, 1].
The following proposition shows that there exists an equilibrium that implements
the allocation function φˆO. The reader may find a characterization of the equilibrium
in its proof.
Proposition 1. There exists an equilibrium of the open auction that implements the
allocation function φˆO.
Proof in the Appendix.
21
??
0 1
1
^
Figure 2: Extension of a function φ in [0, 1].
3.2 Allocation Function of the Sealed Bid Auction
In this subsection we analyze the sealed bid auction. Denote by xi and xd the types
of a non-deviating bidder, say Bidder i, and the deviating bidder, respectively, who
bid in a given equilibrium the same price p. Again for the reasons explained at the
beginning of the section, our equilibrium condition for the non-deviating bidder is:
(1− ρ)E
Ti + n∑
j=1
Qj
∣∣∣Xηi = Xηj = xi, Xηdd ≤ xd, {Xηl ≤ xi}l 6=d,i,j
+
ρE
Ti + n∑
j=1
Qj
∣∣Xηi = xi, Xηdd = xd, {Xηl ≤ xi}l 6=d,i
− p = 0, (6)
where, ρ is the probability that i ties with the deviating bidder given that Bidder i
ties with the maximum bid of the other bidders at price p, this is,
ρ ≡
xn−2i
bSd
′(xd)
xn−2i
bSd
′(xd)
+ (n− 2) x
n−3
i xd
bSnd
′(xi)
,
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where bSnd and b
S
d denote the equilibrium bid functions of the non-deviating bidder and
the deviating bidder, respectively.
Similarly, our equilibrium condition for the deviating bidder with type xd is in this
case:
E
Td + n∑
j=1
Qj
∣∣∣∣∣∣Xηdd = xd, Xηi = xi, {Xηj ≤ xi}j 6=d,i
− p = 0. (7)
Suppose now that φS is the allocation function implemented in the sealed bid
auction. This means that bSd (x) = b
S
nd(φS(x)), which implies by the implicit function
theorem that φ′S(x) =
bSd
′(x)
bSnd
′(φS(x))
. If we use this fact, and combine Equation (6) and
Equation (7) eliminating p, we get after some algebra the following equation:
φ′S(x)
(
E[Td|Xηdd = x]−E[Ti|Xηi = φS(x)] + µ(x, ηd)− µ(φS(x), η)
)
=[
φS(x)
(n− 2)x
] (
E[Ti|Xηi = φS(x)]− E[Td|Xηdd = x]
)
. (8)
The right hand side of Equation (8) corresponds to the case in which the highest
bid of the other bidders is the deviating bidder’s, i.e. ρ = 1, as it was the case in
the open auction. In fact, this right hand side equals to zero if φS(x) = φO(x) in
the domain of φO. This holds true in spite of the differences on the information on
which the bidders condition in each auction because of our assumption of additive
separability and independency of the bidders’ types.
The left hand side of Equation (8) corresponds to the case in which the highest bid
of the other bidders is the bid of another non-deviating bidder, i.e. ρ = 0. Making it
equal to zero we get the following equation in xi and xd:
E[Td|Xηdd = xd]− E[Ti|Xηi = xi] + µ(xd, ηd)− µ(xi, η) = 0. (9)
Under our assumptions, the left hand side of Equation (9) is continuous in xd and
xi, strictly increasing in xd and strictly decreasing in xi. As a consequence, Equation
(9) defines a implicit function φ∗ that maps types of the deviating bidder xd into types
of the non-deviating bidders xi. We define in a similar way to φˆO, the extension of φ∗
and φ−1∗ on the domain [0, 1] and we denote them by φˆ∗ and φˆ−1∗ respectively.
The next lemma shows that there exists a solution to the differential equation (8)
that lies between φˆO and φˆ∗. Note that one difference with φO is that this solution
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depends on n because Equation (8) does so. For this reason we denote by φS,n the
solution, with a slight abuse of notation. We also define the extensions of φS,n and
φ−1S,n on [0, 1] in a similar way as we defined φˆO and φˆ
−1
O , and denote them by φˆS,n and
φˆ−1S,n respectively.
Lemma 2. For a fixed value of n, there exists a continuous strictly increasing function
φS,n whose graph splits [0, 1]2 into two sets, and whose extensions satisfy that φˆS,n(1) ≥
φˆ∗(1) and φˆ−1S,n(1) ≥ φˆ−1O (1). Moreover, the graph of φS,n lies between the graph of φO
and the graph of φ∗; and the graph of φS,n+1 lies between the graph of φS,n and the
graph of φ∗.
Proof in the Appendix.
The conditions on the extensions of φˆS,n and φˆ−1S,n in Lemma 2 are necessary to
ensure that the allocation function φˆS,n can be implemented in an equilibrium of the
sealed bid auction.
Note that Lemma 2 also states that the increase in the number of bidders make the
allocation function φˆS,n approach, in some sense, the auxiliary function φˆ∗. Intuitively,
the greater is n, the less probable is that the highest bid of the other bidders is the bid
of the deviating bidder, and thus, the closer the equilibrium allocation function should
be to the auxiliary function φˆ∗. This result ensures that as n grows in Proposition
3 there is no counter effect to the differences in allocations between auction formats
shown in Lemma 4.
The next proposition shows that there exists an equilibrium that implements the
allocation function φˆS,n. Again, the reader may found a characterization of the equi-
librium in the proof.
Proposition 2. There exists an equilibrium of the sealed bid auction that implements
the allocation function φˆS,n.
Proof in the Appendix.
24
3.3 Comparison of the Equilibrium Allocation Functions
We shall show next how the equilibrium allocation functions φˆO and φˆS,n have the
properties that correspond to the strategic effects that we analyze at the beginning of
the section.
Our first result shows that the increase in the information precision in the common
value information model allows the deviating bidder to win more often in the sealed
bid auction than in the open auction. The opposite happens when the deviating bidder
decreases her information precision.
Lemma 3. In the common value information model and for any x ∈ [0, 1]:
• If ηd > η, then φˆS,n(x) ≥ φˆO(x) = x.
• If ηd < η, then φˆS,n(x) ≤ φˆO(x) = x.
Proof. The definition of φˆO in Equation (5) implies that φˆO is invariant to changes
in ηd in the common value information model. Moreover, our symmetry assumption
implies that φˆO(x) = x for all x ∈ (0, 1). For the sealed bid auction we analyze the
case ηd > η, the other case is symmetric. By our additional assumption in the common
value information model µ(x, ηd) > µ(x, η), which means that,
E[Td|Xηdd = x]− E[Ti|Xηi = x] + µ(x, ηd)− µ(x, η) > 0.
Since E[Ti|Xηi = x] + µ(x, η) is increasing in x, to satisfy Equation (9), φ∗(x) must be
greater than x. Since φˆO(x) = x, the application of Lemma 2 concludes the proof. ¥
A version of Lemma 3 also holds when we do not assume that µ(x, η) is increasing
in η. In that case, however, the result is only true for x close to one. We could still
derive the first item of Proposition 3, but in this case only for n sufficiently large.
Our second result looks at the private value information model. We show that
the increase in the information precision of the deviating bidder makes her win more
often in the open auction than in the sealed bid auction, at least for high bids, i.e.
realizations of the private signal close to one. The opposite happens when the deviating
bidder decreases her information precision.
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Lemma 4. In the private value information model and for any x sufficiently close to
one:
• If ηd > η, then φˆ−1O (x) < φˆ−1S,n(x) < φˆ−1∗ (x) < x.
• If ηd < η, then φˆO(x) < φˆS,n(x) ≤ φˆ∗(x) < x.
Proof. We only study the case ηd > η, the other one is similar. By our assumptions in
the private value information acquisition model E[Td|Xηdd = 1] strictly increases with
ηd, which means that E[Td|Xηdd = 1] − E[Ti|Xηi = 1] > 0, and thus that φ−1O (1) < 1,
and,
E[Td|Xηdd = φ−1O (1)]− E[Ti|Xηi = 1] + µ(φ−1O (1), ηd)− µ(1, η) < 0.
Moreover,
E[Td|Xηdd = 1]− E[Ti|Xηi = 1] + µ(1, ηd)− µ(1, η) > 0,
since µ(1, η) is constant with respect to η in the private value information model. We
can thus conclude that φ−1O (1) < φ
−1∗ (1) < 1. An application of Lemma 2 implies that
φ−1O (1) < φ
−1
S,n(1) = φ
−1∗ (1) < 1, which implies the lemma by continuity and by Lemma
2. ¥
4 Analysis of the Game of Information Acquisition
In this section, we study the first stage game, the game of information acquisition.
In this game bidders choose simultaneously and independently an information preci-
sion η each at some monetary cost that we do not model explicitly yet. We assume
that the bidders’ continuation payoffs are those that correspond to the equilibrium in
Propositions 1 and 2 in the former section.
To compute the continuation payoffs, note that under our assumption of indepen-
dent types, and by the arguments of the analysis of Myerson (1981), the allocation
function and the expected utility of the minimum types characterizes the expected
utility of the bidders. Moreover, the additive separability of the bidders’ utility func-
tion makes specially simple the expression of the bidder’s expected utility. Next lemma
shows these claims.
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Lemma 5. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium for a given auction mechanism in
which the allocation function φ is implemented. Then, the ex-ante expected utility of
the deviating bidder in this equilibrium of the auction mechanism is equal to:∫ 1
0
(1− x)φ(x)n−1∂E[Td +Qd|X
ηd
d = x]
∂x
dx
plus the expected utility that the deviating bidder gets when she has type 0.
Proof. Straightforward adaptation of the arguments by Myerson (1981). ¥
We denote by Ua(ηd, η) the expected utility of a deviating bidder in auction format
a ∈ {S,O} when her information precision is ηd and all the other bidders’ information
precision is equal to η. We also define ∆U
a
∆η (ηd, η) ≡ U
a(ηd,η)−Ua(η,η)
ηd−η and call it the
incentives to acquire information. Note that ∆U
a
∆η (ηd, η) is the expected gains, or losses,
that a deviating bidder gets when she acquires more, respectively less, information than
the others and divided by ηd − η.
There is some kind of revenue equivalence between both auction formats when all
bidders have the same level of information precision, in the sense that UO(η, η) =
US(η, η). The reason is that in a symmetric equilibrium, the allocation function is the
identity in both auction formats and the minimum type always loses and thus gets
zero expected utility. This implies that the comparison of the incentives to acquire
information is equivalent to the comparison of UO(ηd, η) and US(ηd, η) which depends
basically on the allocation functions φˆO and φˆS,n. The next proposition, which is
central in our analysis, makes use of this feature:
Proposition 3.
• In the common value information model, the sealed bid auction gives greater
incentives to acquire information than the open auction, in the sense that for
any ηd 6= η, ∆UO∆η (ηd, η) ≥ ∆U
S
∆η (ηd, η).
• In the private value information model, the open ascending auction gives greater
incentives to acquire information than the sealed bid auction, in the sense that
for any ηd 6= η, ∆UO∆η (ηd, η) ≥ ∆U
S
∆η (ηd, η) if n is large enough.
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Proof. From the arguments above we can conclude that the first item only requires to
prove that UO(ηd, η)−US(ηd, η) is positive if ηd > η and negative otherwise. This is a
more or less straightforward consequence of Lemmas 3 and 5. The only difficulty that
arises in the proof is with respect to the expected utility of a deviating bidder with
type zero. This type gets zero expected utility in the open auction because she loses
with probability one as φˆO(0) = 0. Moreover, this type gets non-negative expected
utility in the sealed bid auction if ηd > η because then φˆS,n(0) ≥ 0; and zero expected
utility if ηd < η because then φˆS,n(0) = 0.
The second item is slightly more complicated. We start with the case ηd > η which
is simpler. We can easily derive from Lemmas 4 and 5 that:
lim
n→∞U
O(ηd, η) =
∫ 1
φˆ−1O (1)
(1− x)∂E[Td +Qd|X
ηd
d = x]
∂x
dx. (10)
Note that we ignore the expected utility of the deviating bidder with type zero.
The reason is that it tends to zero as n grows to infinity since φˆ−1O (1) > 0 and thus,
the probability that this type wins goes to zero.
A similar argument holds for the sealed bid auction. The only difference is that
we also need to use the monotonicity of φˆS,n(x) with respect to n in Lemma 2 and the
monotone convergence theorem. The corresponding limit is:
lim
n→∞U
S(ηd, η) =
∫ 1
φˆ−1S,∞(1)
(1− x)∂E[Td +Qd|X
ηd
d = x]
∂x
dx, (11)
where φˆ−1S,∞(1) is the limit of φˆ
−1
S,n(1).
That the limit in Equation (10) is strictly less than the limit in Equation (11)
follows from an application of Lemma 4. We can thus conclude that there must exists
a bound on the number of bidders such that for any n above this bound, it holds true
that UO(ηd, η) > US(ηd, η) for ηd > η.
The case ηd < η has a similar proof although in this case, we have to divide
both expected utilities by φˆO(1)n before we compute their limits and compare them.
Otherwise both limits are equal to zero, and hence, do not provide any information to
the comparison for a finite n. ¥
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An additional question of interest is whether the strategic effects in our model
are such that they make the returns of additional private information negative. This
was for instance the concern of the work of Larson (2004), and Hernando-Veciana
and Tro¨ge (2005). To give an answer to this question, it refine our concept of more
informative signals. In particular, we assume in the remaining of the paper that:
∂E[Qi|Xηi =x]
∂x is strictly increasing with respect to η in the common value information
acquisition model;15 and that ∂E[Ti|X
η
i =x]
∂x is strictly increasing with respect to η in the
private value information acquisition model. This refinement of the concept of more
informative signals has been used before by Hagedorn (2004), and intuitively means
that the expected posterior is more sensitive to the signal.
Proposition 4.
• In the common value information model, the incentives to acquire information
are strictly positive in both auction formats, in the sense that ∆U
a
∆η (ηd, η) > 0 if
ηd 6= η and for a ∈ {O,S}.
• In the private value information model, the incentives to acquire information
are strictly positive in both auction formats, in the sense that ∆U
a
∆η (ηd, η) > 0 if
ηd 6= η and for a ∈ {O,S}, if the number of bidders is sufficiently large.
Proof. The first item is a direct consequence of Lemmas 3 and 5 and our assumption
that ∂E[Qi|X
η
i =x]
∂x is strictly increasing with respect to η. The second item can be proved
with a similar argument using Lemmas 4 and 5 and our assumption that ∂E[Ti|X
η
i =x]
∂x
is strictly increasing with respect to η. The only difference is that we have to take
limits with respect to n and argue that the sign in the limit still holds for n sufficiently
large. ¥
The first result contrasts with the results of Hernando-Veciana and Tro¨ge (2005)
which imply that additional information about the common value may decrease the
15To see that this new assumption is a refinement of our concept of more informative signals note
that
∂E[Vi|Xηi =x]
∂x
strictly increasing with respect to η for all x ∈ [0, 1] implies that E[Vi|Xηi ≤ x]
decreases with respect to η for all x ∈ [0, 1].
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expected utility of the bidder. The reason for this discrepancy is that in the model
of Hernando-Veciana and Tro¨ge (2005), when one bidder acquires more information
about the common value, her bid becomes less informative of the private value, and in
our model we have explicitly ruled out this effect. See our discussion in page 12.
Finally, we show that the results derived in this section may be used to prove that
the auction with greater incentives to acquire information induce more information
acquisition. To prove so, we introduce some additional assumptions. The reason is to
assure that there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in the game of information
acquisition. We follow a similar approach to Persico (2000).
We assume that N is an interval [0, 1] and that the cost of acquiring information
precision is the same for all bidders and equal to C(η) = α2 η
2, for α ∈ (0,∞). We also
require the function Ua(ηd, η) to satisfy certain technical assumptions. In particular,
we assume it to have continuous differentials with respect to both ηd and η. Finally, we
assume that the limit properties with respect to n in the second bullet of Propositions
3 and 4 hold not only pointwise as they are stated but uniformly in the set {(η, ηd) ∈
N 2 : η 6= ηd}.
Proposition 5.
• In the common value information model and if α is sufficiently large, there exist
a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in the game of information acquisition in
both the sealed bid and the open auction, and in this equilibrium there is more
information acquisition in the sealed bid auction than in the open auction.
• In the private value information model and if α and n are sufficiently large, there
exist a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in the game of information acquisition
in both the sealed bid and the open auction, and in this equilibrium there is more
information acquisition in the open auction than in the sealed bid auction.
Proof. We start with the first item. A necessary condition for η to be a symmetric Nash
equilibrium is that ∂U
a
∂ηd
(η, η) = C ′(η), a ∈ {O,S}. This equation has a unique solution
for α sufficiently large follows since C ′(η) = αη, ∂U
a
∂ηd
(η, η) ≥ 0 by Proposition 4 and
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Ua has continuous differentials. This implies uniqueness of the equilibrium. We denote
by η∗ the solution to the former equation and only candidate for an equilibrium point.
To prove existence, it is sufficient to show that ∆U
a
∆η (ηd, η∗) − C(ηd)−C(η∗)ηd−η∗ < 0 if and
only if ηd < η∗. This is the case for α sufficiently large since
C(ηd)−C(η∗)
ηd−η∗ =
α
2 (ηd + η∗).
Once we have proved existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, the result in the first
item of Proposition 3 imply that there is more information acquisition in the sealed
bid auction than in the open auction. The proof of the second item is similar but
we need to start choosing an n large enough so that the results in Proposition 3 and
Proposition 4 apply. ¥
5 Revenue and Efficiency
We can derive from the results in Proposition 5 some conclusions with respect to the
revenue and efficiency comparison of our two auction formats. To do so, we shall
assume in this section that the equilibria that correspond to Proposition 5 are played
in each of our two auctions.
We start analyzing efficiency. We shall distinguish two concepts of efficiency. We
talk of the ex post efficiency as the expected value of the winning bidder.16 This concept
captures the allocative efficiency of the auction. We also talk of ex ante efficiency as
the expected value of the winning bidder net of the information acquisition costs in
which all the bidders incur, in a symmetric equilibrium nC(η).
We first provide results for standard-symmetric auctions. These are auctions in
which all bidders have the same information precision, the bidder with highest type
wins, and only the winning bidder makes a payment to the auctioneer. Note that our
two auction formats are standard-symmetric when all bidders have the same informa-
tion precision, as it happens in the equilibrium path in Proposition 5.
Lemma 6. In a standard-symmetric auction:
16A social planner may be interested in ex post efficiency to avoid costly renegotiation after the
auction. Moreover, note that allocating a monopoly license to the minimum cost bidder maximizes
the consumer surplus.
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• The ex post efficiency of the auction is increasing in η in the private value infor-
mation acquisition model and remains constant in the common value information
acquisition model.
• The ex ante efficiency of the auction is decreasing in η in the common value
information acquisition model.
Proof. The ex post efficiency is equal to E[max{E[Ti|Xηi ]}i∈I ] + nE[Qi]. That this
expression is constant in the common value information acquisition model is obvious.
This also implies the second bullet, i.e. that the ax ante efficiency of the auction is
decreasing in η in the common value information acquisition model. The proof that ex
post efficiency increases with η is a direct consequence of the convexity of the maximum
function and the fact that a more informative signal in the private value information
acquisition model spreads the distribution of E[Ti|XηI ] in the sense of second order
stochastic dominance, see Lemma 8 in Appendix D. ¥
Corollary 1.
• The open auction induces greater ex post efficiency than the sealed bid auction
in the private value information acquisition model, at least when the number of
bidders is sufficiently large.
• The open auction induces greater ex ante efficiency than the sealed bid auction
in the common value information acquisition model.
Finally, the next lemma studies the auctioneer’s expected revenue.
Lemma 7. In a standard-symmetric auction:
• The expected revenue of the auctioneer is decreasing in η in the common value
information acquisition model.
• The expected revenue of the auctioneer is increasing in η in the private value
information acquisition model if the number of bidders is sufficiently large.
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Proof. The expected revenue of the auctioneer is equal to the surplus generated in
the auction minus the bidders’ expected utility, both gross of information acquisition
costs. The former is equal to the expected value of the bidder who wins, i.e.:∫ 1
0
E[Ti|Xηi = x] dxn + nE[Qi], (12)
and the latter can be computed from Lemma 5 taking expectations with respect to the
bidder’s type and after some algebra to be equal to:∫ 1
0
(1− x)∂E[Ti +Qi|X
η
i = x]
∂x
dxn. (13)
The first result follows from the fact that Equation (12) is constant and Equation
(13) is increasing with respect to η in the common value information acquisition model.
To prove the second result, we can combine Equations (12) and (13) to show after some
algebra that the auctioneer’s expected revenue is equal to:∫ 1
0
(
E[Ti|Xηi = x]− (1− x)
∂E[Ti|Xηi = x]
∂x
)
dxn+
nE[Qi]−
∫ 1
0
(1− x)∂E[Qi|X
η
i = x]
∂x
dxn.
The second integral is constant with respect to η in the private value information
acquisition model, whereas the integrand of the first integral is increasing in η for
values of x close to one. Consequently, for values of n sufficiently large, the above
expression is increasing in η. ¥
Corollary 2. The open auction gives greater expected revenue to the auctioneer than
the sealed bid auction: in the common value information acquisition model, for any
number of bidders; and in the private value information acquisition model, for a number
of bidders sufficiently large.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the strategic effects associated to open information
acquisition. This strategic effects originate from a bidder’s information acquisition de-
cision affecting the other bidders’ bid behavior. In particular, we have shown that these
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strategic effects are such that a bidder has greater incentives to acquire information
about the common value in a sealed bid auction than in an open auction. However,
we have also shown that if the information acquisition is about the private value, the
incentives are greater in an open auction than in a sealed bid auction, at least when
the number of bidders is sufficiently large.
We have shown that there is more information acquisition about the common value
and less about the private value in the sealed bid auction than in the open auction. We
have also shown that these results may imply that the open auction is more efficient
and generates more expected revenue than the sealed bid auction once the bidders’
information acquisition decisions are endogenized.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix has four parts. In Appendix A we prove Proposition 1. Appendix
B shows that there exists a solution to the differential equation of Lemma 2 and in
Appendix C we prove Proposition 2. Finally, in Appendix D we provide an auxiliary
result that shows the equivalence between a more informative signal and a more spread
mean posterior.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
We start defining some strategies making use of the allocation function φˆO. We proceed
sequentially, first, information sets in which nobody has left the auction yet:
• Bid function of the deviating bidder:
b0d[x|∅] ≡ E
Td + n∑
j=1
Qj
∣∣∣∣∣∣Xηdd = x,Xηi = φˆO(x),
{
Xηj = φˆO(x)
}
j 6=d,i
 .
• Bid function of a non-deviating bidder17 i 6= d:
b0i [x|∅] ≡ E
Ti + n∑
j=1
Qj
∣∣∣∣∣∣Xηdd = φˆ−1O (x), Xηi = x,
{
Xηj = x
}
j 6=d,i
 .
Next we define the bid function in information sets in which k bidders have left
the auction and where pl is the price at which the l-th bidder in declaring inactive has
quit, and jl is her identity. First, when the non-deviating bidder is not among the k
bidders who have left the auction. To shorten notation, we do not include the range
of sub-index l which is always from 1 to k.
• Bid function of the deviating bidder:
17We index each bid function by the identity of the bidder for convenience in the notation. However,
note that all the non-deviating bidders use the same bid function.
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bkd [t|{(pl, jl)}] ≡
E
Td + n∑
j=1
Qj
∣∣∣∣∣∣Xηdd = x,
{
Xηj = φˆO(x)
}
j 6∈{jl}
j 6=d
,
{
bl−1jl
[
Xηjl |{(pq, jq)}l−1q=1
]
= pl
} ,
where we adopt the convention that {(pq, jq)}0q=1 = ∅.
• Bid function of a non-deviating bidders, i 6= d:
bki [t|{(pl, jl)}] ≡
E
Ti + n∑
j=1
Qj
∣∣∣∣∣∣Xηdd = φˆ−1O (x),
{
Xηj = x
}
j 6∈{jl}
j 6=d
,
{
bl−1jl
[
Xηjl |{(pq, jq)}l−1q=1
]
= pl
} .
And when the deviating bidder is among the bidders who have left the auction,
i 6= d:
bkj [t|{(pl, jl)}] ≡
E
Ti + n∑
j=1
Qj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
{
Xηj = x
}
j 6∈{jl}
,
{
bl−1jl
[
X
ηjl
jl
|{(pq, jq)}l−1q=1
]
= pl
} ,
where ηjl = η for any jl 6= d.
Note that the proposed strategies implement φˆO. First, all non-deviating bidders
use the same strictly increasing bid function, and thus the highest type of the non-
deviating bidders outbids all the other non-deviating bidders. Second, the deviating
bidder with a generic type xd outbids the non-deviating bidder with maximum type,
say xi if and only if xi < φˆO(xd). This is because the deviating bidder also uses
a strictly increasing bid function and the deviating bidder with type xd submits the
same bid as a non-deviating bidder with type φˆO(xd) if φˆO(xd) ∈ (0, 1).
To see why these strategies form an equilibrium, we show that the deviating bidder
does not have incentives to deviate. The proof is similar for non-deviating bidders.
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Note first that the expected valuation of the deviating bidder conditional on a realiza-
tion of the vector of bidders’ types (x1, x2, ..., xn) ∈ (0, 1)n is equal to:
E
Td + n∑
j=1
Qj
∣∣∣∣∣∣Xηdd = xd,
{
Xηj = xj
}
j 6=d
 .
On the other hand, if all the non-deviating bidders follow the proposed strategy,
the price that the deviating bidder pays if she wins is equal to the bid of the bidder
with highest type among the non-deviating bidders, say Bidder i. This bid is equal to:
E
Ti + n∑
j=1
Qj
∣∣∣∣∣∣Xηdd = φˆ−1O (xi),
{
Xηj = xj
}
j 6=d
 .
After some algebra, we may show that the difference between these two values is
equal to:
E[Td|Xηdd = xd]−E[Ti|Xηi = xi] + E[Qd|Xηdd = xd]− E[Qd|Xηdd = φˆ−1O (xi)]. (14)
The deviating bidder cannot improve with a deviation because she wins with our
proposed strategy if and only if xd ≥ φˆ−1O (xi), and these are all the cases in which the
former expression is non-negative. To see why, note that the expression is increasing in
xd and by definition of φˆO, the expression evaluated at xd = φˆ−1O (xi) is equal to zero if
φˆ−1O (xi) ∈ (0, 1), weakly negative if φˆ−1O (xi) = 1, and weakly positive if φˆ−1O (xi) = 0.¥
Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 2
We look for a strictly increasing and continuous solution to Equation (8) whose graph
splits the set [0, 1]2 into two subsets. This means that the required solution must start
at a point either in the left or down boundaries of the set [0, 1]2 and end at a point in
either the right or top boundary of [0, 1]2.
To show that there exists a solution to Equation (8) with the required conditions,
we distinguish three disjoint subsets of (0, 1)2. The first subset that we denote by SM
includes points (x, φ) such that φ = φO(x) = φ∗(x). The second subset, and that we
denote by SL, includes points (x, φ) such that φ ∈ (φˆO(x), φˆ∗(x)). The last subset,
which will be denoted by SR, includes points (x, φ) such that φ ∈ (φˆ∗(x), φˆO(x)). We
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decompose the set SL in a collection of disjoint sets {SLl }, where {SLl } is the collection
of open connected sets with minimum number of elements that covers the set SL.
Similarly, we decompose the set SR in a collection of disjoint sets {SRl }, where {SRl }
is the collection of open connected sets with minimum number of elements that covers
the set SR. Figure 3 illustrates the set SM and the collections {SLl } and {SRl }.
SM
??
??
x
?
SL2
SL3
SL1
SR2
SR1
SR3
0 1
1
^
^
Figure 3: Illustration of the sets SM and the collections {SLl } and {SRl } for some
arbitrary functions φˆO and φˆ∗.
Since the functions φˆO and φˆ∗ are continuous, strictly increasing and their graphs
split the set [0, 1]2, there are continuous and strictly increasing paths that cross each
of the sets SM , {SLl } and {SRl } and split the set [0, 1]2 into two. We shall show that
one of these paths satisfies the conditions of the lemma.
In sets SM we have no choice but to chose φS,n(x) equal to φO(x) and φ∗(x). To
define φS,n outside SM , we introduce an auxiliary function to rewrite Equation (8):
Φ(x, φ) ≡ φ
x(n− 2)
E[Ti|Xηi = φ]− E[Td|Xηdd = x]
E[Td|Xηdd = x]−E[Ti|Xηi = φ] + µ(x, ηd)− µ(φ, η)
, (15)
Thus, our differential equation can be written as φ′S,n(x) = Φ(x, φS,n(x)). In what
follows we shall show how to construct our function φS,n in a given set SRl as a solution
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to the former differential. We shall only consider the case in which the boundary of
SRl does not contain any point in the boundary of [0, 1]
2. The proof when this is not
the case and for the remaining subsets {SLl } and {SRl } is very similar. We point out
the differences below.
In our proof we show that there exists a path from the lower-left corner to the
upper-right corner of SRl that solves our differential equation in S
R
l . We follow several
steps.
• Remark 1: There exists a unique solution to φ′S,n(x) = Φ(x, φS,n(x)) that passes
by any given point (x0, φ0) in SRl . Moreover, the solution is strictly increasing.
This is a direct consequence of the fact that Φ is differentiable, and thus satisfies a
Lipschitz condition at (x0, φ0), and thus we can apply Coddington and Levinson
(1984)[Theorem 2.2, pag. 10]. That the solution is strictly increasing follows
because the denominator and the numerator of the expression that defines Φ are
strictly negative. This is because the numerator is equal to zero at φ = φO(x)
and it is strictly increasing in φ, and moreover, the denominator is equal to zero
at φ = φ∗(x) and it is strictly decreasing in φ.
• Remark 2: The solutions of our differential equation in the set SRl do not cross
and they converge to the upper-right corner of SRl as we continue them to the
right.
That they do not cross is a consequence of Remark 1. The convergence to
the upper-right is because any solution to our differential equation cannot cross
neither φO nor φ∗ as it is continued to the right. First, it cannot cross φO because
the slope of φO is bounded away from zero, which can be proved applying the
implicit function theorem to Equation (14), and the slope of any solution tends
to zero, as it approaches the graph of φO from below. And second, the solution
cannot cross φ∗ because the slope of φ∗ has derivative bounded from above, which
can be proved applying the implicit function theorem to Equation (9), and the
slope of any solution tends to infinity, as it approaches the graph of φ∗ from
above.
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• Remark 3: There exists a solution to our differential in SRl and with boundary
condition any point in the boundary of SRl but the lower-left and the upper-right
corners.
For points in φO the claim can be proved as in Remark 1 by showing that
there exists a solution that passes by the corresponding point, and noting that
since Φ equals zero for these points, the solution can be continued towards the
interior of SRl . For points in φ∗ the proof is similar, but in this case it is more
convenient to operate with an auxiliary differential equation that corresponds to
the inverse of our original differential equation, i.e. ψ′(φ) = 1Φ(ψ(φ),φ) . By the
same arguments as with boundary conditions in φO, there exists a solution to
the auxiliary differential equation and it can be continued towards the interior.
Moreover, since in the interior of SRl the solution must be strictly increasing, it
is invertible, and thus, its inverse must be solution to our original differential
equation.
• Remark 4: There exists a solution to our differential equation in SRl that starts
at the lower-left corner, say (xL, φL) and ends at the top-right corner.
Take a conditionally decreasing sequence {xξ} that converges to xL and define
two sequences of solutions to our differential equation in SRl . The first sequence
is characterized by the sequence of boundary conditions {(xξ, φO(xξ))} and the
second sequence by the sequence of boundary conditions {(xξ, φ∗(xξ))}. Note
that Remark 3 implies the required solutions exist. Moreover, by Remark 2
none of the solutions of the two sequences can cross. This implies three things.
First, the first sequence is a decreasing sequence, and the second sequence is an
increasing sequence, and thus both sequences have point-wise limits18 that we
denote by φ and φ, respectively. The second implication is that φ(x) ≤ φ(x). The
third implication is that any solution to our original differential equation that is
18A careful reader may realize that the domain of the functions in our two sequences does not remain
constant. A simple way of dealing with this problem is to define any element of the first sequence
φξ(x) ≡ φO(x) if x ∈ [xL, xξ], and similarly, any element of the second sequence φξ(x) ≡ φ∗(x) if
x ∈ [xL, xξ].
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between φ and φ for some values of x must lie between φ and φ in all the domain.
Moreover, since φ and φ go from the lower-left corner to the upper-right corner
of SRl , the continuation of any solution between φ and φ to the right converges
to the upper-right corner of SRl and to the left converges to the down-left corner.
There exists a selection of the solutions that correspond to Remark 4 that satisfies
that φS,n+1 lies between φS,n and φS,n. To see why note that an increase in n decreases
the function that generates our differential equation Φ, see Equation (15). As a con-
sequence the vector field associated should become flatter at any point in SRl . This
means that the solutions constructed from left to right when the number of bidders is
n + 1 go below the corresponding solutions when the number of bidders is n, which
implies the result.
In other sets SRl or in sets S
L
l the construction of the solution is similar. It is
only worth remarking two points. First, in sets SRl we proceed basically as above
extending all the auxiliary solutions to the right. As we have shown in Remark 2, the
properties of the vector field generated by Φ assures in this case that the solution does
not escape from the set SRl . However, in sets S
L
l we proceed differently. We extend the
auxiliary solutions to the left as it is what the properties of the vector field generated
by Φ require to ensure that the auxiliary solutions do not escape from SLl . Second,
in a set SLl whose boundary intersects the upper and right boundaries of [0, 1]
2, we
shall chose a solution with boundary condition (1, φˆ∗(1)), if φˆ∗(1) < 1; (φˆ−1O (1), 1) if
φˆ−1O (1) < 1; and (1, 1) otherwise. These boundary conditions are sufficient to ensure
that φˆS,n(1) ≥ φˆ∗(1) and φˆ−1S,n(1) ≥ φˆ−1O (1).
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 2
We start proposing some strategies and later we show that they form an equilibrium.
In our construction we use the function φˆS,n of Lemma 2.
• Bid function of the deviating bidder:
bSd (x) ≡ E
Td + n∑
j=1
Qj
∣∣∣∣∣∣Xηdd = x,Xηi = φˆS,n(x),
{
Xηj ≤ φˆS,n(x)
}
j 6=d,i
 .
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• Bid function of a non-deviating bidder i 6= d:
bSnd(x) ≡
(1− ρˆ(x))E
Ti + n∑
j=1
Qj
∣∣∣Xηi = Xηj = x,Xηdd ≤ φˆ−1S,n(x), {Xηl ≤ x}l 6=d,i,j
+
ρˆ(x)E
Ti + n∑
j=1
Qj
∣∣∣Xηi = x,Xηdd = φˆ−1S,n(x), {Xηl ≤ x}l 6=d,i

where, ρˆ(x) ≡ 0 if x ≥ φˆS,n(1), ρˆ(x) ≡ 1 if x ≤ φˆS,n(0), and otherwise,
ρˆ(x) ≡ x
x+ (n− 2) φˆ−1S,n(x) φˆ′S,n(φˆ−1S,n(x))
.
That the proposed strategies implement φˆS can be proved exactly as in the proof of
Proposition 1. It only remains to be shown that the bid function bSnd is indeed strictly
increasing, and in particular for x in the interval [φˆS,n(0), φˆS,n(1)]. Outside this interval
the monotonicity is trivial. In the interior of this interval, and by definition of φˆS,n,
the bid is equal to:
E
Td + n∑
j=1
Qj
∣∣∣∣∣∣Xηi = x,Xηdd = φˆ−1S,n(x),
{
Xηj ≤ x
}
j 6=d,i
 ,
and thus, it is strictly increasing.
In the lower end of the interval, i.e. x = φˆS,n(0), we may have problems only if
φˆS,n(0) > 0 and there is a discontinuity. In this case, φˆ−1S,n(x) = 0, and thus the limit
of the bid function when we approach x from the left is equal to:
E
Ti + n∑
j=1
Qj
∣∣Xηi = x,Xηdd = 0, {Xηl ≤ x}l 6=d,i
 ,
which is clearly less than,
E
Ti + n∑
j=1
Qj
∣∣∣Xηi = Xηj = x,Xηdd = 0, {Xηl ≤ x}l 6=d,i,j
 .
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We can conclude that the bid function must be increasing at x = φˆS,n(0) because the
limit of the bid function when we approach x from the right is a weighted average of
the two expected values above.
In the upper end of the interval, i.e. x = φˆS,n(1), we may have problems only if
φˆS,n(1) < 1 and there is a discontinuity. In this case, φˆ−1S,n(x) = 1, and thus the limit
of the bid function from the right is equal to:
E
Ti + n∑
j=1
Qj
∣∣∣Xηi = Xηj = x,Xηdd ≤ 1, {Xηl ≤ x}l 6=d,i,j
 .
By Lemma 2, φˆS,n(1) ≥ φˆ∗(1) and hence x ≥ φˆ∗(1) which means that,
E[Ti|Xηi = x] + µ(x, η) ≥ E[Td|Xηdd = 1] + µ(1, ηd).
This implies that the limit from the right is greater than:
E
Td + n∑
j=1
Qj
∣∣∣∣∣∣Xηi = x,Xηdd = 1,
{
Xηj ≤ x
}
j 6=d,i
 .
By definition of φˆS,n, this last expected value is equal to the limit of the bid function
as we approach x from the left.
Finally, we shall prove that our proposed strategies form an equilibrium by showing
that an individual bidder does not have incentives to deviate when all the other bidders
follow our proposed strategies. In particular, we show that our proposed strategies
ensures the bidder that she wins if and only if it is profitable for her to win.
We start with the deviating bidder. Her expected value of the good conditional on
her type xd, and the realization of the maximum of the other bidders’ types, say the
type of Bidder i and denote it by xi, is equal to:
E
Td + n∑
j=1
Qj
∣∣∣∣∣∣Xηdd = xd, Xηi = xi,
{
Xηj ≤ xi
}
j 6=d,i
 .
Moreover, if the deviating bidder wins the auction, she pays the bid of the highest type
of the non-deviating bidders, i.e. the bid of Bidder i.
If xi ≥ φˆS,n(1), then the bid of Bidder i is equal to:
E
Ti + n∑
j=1
Qj
∣∣∣∣∣∣Xηi = Xηj = xi, Xηdd ≤ 1,
{
Xηj ≤ xi
}
j 6=d,i,j
 .
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The difference between value and price is equal after some simplifications to:
E[Td|Xηdd = xd] + E[Qd|Xηdd = xd] − E[Ti|Xηi = xi] − E[Qd|Xηdd ≤ 1] − µ(xi, η),
which is less than,
E[Td|Xηdd = 1]−E[Ti|Xηi = xi] + µ(1, ηd)− µ(xi, η).
Since xi ≥ φˆS,n(1) and by Lemma 2, φˆS,n(1) ≥ φˆ∗(1), then xi ≥ φˆ∗(1), which means
that the above expression must be negative. Our proposed bid function ensures the
deviating bidder that she loses in these cases.
If xi ∈ (φˆS,n(0), φˆS,n(1)), then by definition of φˆS,n, the bid of Bidder i and thus
the price is equal to:
E
Td + n∑
j=1
Qj
∣∣∣∣∣∣Xηi = xi, Xηdd = φˆ−1S,n(xi),
{
Xηj ≤ xi
}
j 6=d,i
 .
The difference between value and price in this case is equal to:
E[Td|Xηdd = xd] + E[Qd|Xηdd = xd]− E[Td|Xηdd = φˆS,n(xi)]−E[Qd|Xηdd = φˆS,n(xi)],
which is positive if and only if xd ≥ φˆS,n(xi). Consequently, our proposed strategy
assures the deviating bidder that she wins if it is profitable to win and loses otherwise.
Finally, if xi < φS,n(0), then the price is equal to:
E
Ti + n∑
j=1
Qj
∣∣∣∣∣∣Xηi = xi, Xηdd = 0,
{
Xηj ≤ xi
}
j 6=d,i
 .
The difference between value and price after some simplifications becomes:
E[Td|Xηdd = xd] + E[Qd|Xηdd = xd]− E[Ti|Xηi = xi]− E[Qd|Xηdd = 0],
which is greater than,
E[Td|Xηdd = 0]− E[Ti|Xηi = xi].
This last expression is positive since it may be shown that φˆ∗(0) must be less than
φˆO(0) and hence xi ≤ φˆO(0). The proposed strategy assures the deviating bidder that
she wins in these cases.
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The proof that the non-deviating bidders do not have incentives to deviate is
slightly different. We start denoting by p the price that a non-deviating bidder pays
when she wins. Suppose first that p > bnd(1). Then, the price must be fixed by the
deviating bidder and her type xd must be strictly greater than φ−1(1). We can use
arguments as above to show that a non-deviating bidder gets negative expected utility
if she wins at a price that equals the bid of such types of the deviating bidder. Next
note that it cannot happen that p < bnd(0). The reason is that there is always another
non-deviating bidder, and this other non-deviating bidder never bids above bnd(0) with
probability one.
Finally, suppose that p ∈ [bnd(0), bnd(1)]. To compute Bidder i’s expected value
of the good conditional on winning the auction at a price p we first compute the
conditional probability that it is the deviator who has bid p. By construction our bid
functions satisfy that φˆ′S,n(xj) =
b′d(φS,n(xj))
b′nd(xj)
where xj is the type of the non-deviating
bidders that corresponds to a bid p according to our proposed bidding function, i.e.
xj ≡ b−1nd (p). Thus, we can show that the former probability is equal to ρˆ(xj). This
means that the corresponding conditional expected value is equal to:
ρˆ(xj)E
[
Ti +
n∑
l=1
Ql
∣∣∣∣∣Xηdd = φˆ−1S (xj), Xηi = xi,{Xηl ≤ xl}l 6=d,i
]
+
(1− ρˆ(xj))E
[
Ti +
n∑
l=1
Ql
∣∣∣∣∣Xηi = xi, Xηj = xj , Xηdd ≤ 1,{Xηl ≤ xj}l 6=d,i,j
]
.
But, by definition of xj , the price p is equal to the bid of a non-deviating bidder with
type xj which is equal to:
ρˆ(xj)E
[
Tj +
n∑
l=1
Ql
∣∣∣∣∣Xηdd = φˆ−1S (xj), Xηj = xj ,{Xηl ≤ xj}l 6=d,i
]
+
(1− ρˆ(xj))E
[
Tj +
n∑
l=1
Ql
∣∣∣∣∣Xηi = Xηj = xj , Xηdd ≤ φˆ−1S (xj),{Xηl ≤ xj}l 6=d,i,j
]
.
We can easily conclude by subtracting the former expected values that the differ-
ence between value and price is positive if and only if xi ≥ xj , and hence that our
proposed strategy assures Bidder i that she wins if and only if it is profitable to win.
As a result, Bidder i does not have incentives to deviate.¥
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Appendix D: More Informative Signals and Second Order
Stochastic Dominance
Definition: We say that the distribution F1 dominates in the sense of second order
stochastic dominance the distribution F2 if,∫ ψ
−∞
(
F1(ψ˜)− F2(ψ˜)
)
dψ˜ ≤ 0, ∀ψ ∈ R.
Lemma 8. A signal Xηi is more informative of Vi, Vi ∈ {Ti, Qi}, than another sig-
nal Xη
′
i if and only if the distribution of the conditional expected value E[Vi|Xηi ] is
dominated in the sense of second order stochastic dominance by the distribution of the
conditional expected value E[Vi|Xη
′
i ].
Proof. Let Ψη(x) ≡ E[Vi|Xηi = x] for x ∈ [0, 1], and Ψ−1η its inverse. First note that
the cumulative distribution function of E[Vi|Xηi ] is equal to Ψ−1η . This is because
the probability of the event {E[Vi|Xηi ] ≤ ψ} is equal to Ψ−1η (ψ) for any ψ in the
support of E[Vi|Xηi ]. For completeness we also define Ψ−1η (ψ) ≡ 0 for ψ below the
support of E[Vi|Xηi ], and Ψ−1η (ψ) ≡ 1 above the support of E[Vi|Xηi ]. Note also that
E[Vi|Xηi ≤ x] =
∫ x
0 Ψη(x)
dx˜
x . Hence, we have to prove that:∫ x
0
(
Ψη′(x˜)−Ψη(x˜)
)
dx˜ ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ [0, 1]⇔
∫ ψ
−∞
(
Ψ−1η′ (ψ˜)−Ψ−1η (ψ˜)
)
dψ˜ ≤ 0, ∀ψ ∈ R.
We only prove “⇐”. The proof of “⇒” is symmetric. First, note that,∫ x
0
Ψη(x˜) dx˜ = Ψη(x)x−
∫ x
0
x˜ dΨη(x˜) = Ψη(x)x−
∫ Ψη(x)
−∞
Ψ−1η (ψ˜) dψ˜.
Consequently,∫ x
0
(
Ψη′(x˜)−Ψη(x˜)
)
dx˜ =∫ Ψη(x)
Ψη′ (x)
(
x−Ψ−1η (ψ˜)
)
dψ˜ +
∫ Ψη′ (x)
−∞
(
Ψ−1η′ (ψ˜)−Ψ−1η (ψ˜)
)
dψ˜.
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The second integral is positive by our starting assumption. To compute the sign of the
first integral assume first that Ψη(x) ≥ Ψη′(x). Then the integral is positive because
Ψ−1η (ψ˜) ≤ x for any ψ˜ < Ψη(x). Suppose next that Ψη(x) < Ψη′(x). Then the integral
is positive because Ψ−1η (ψ˜) ≥ x for any ψ˜ > Ψη(x). ¥
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